Malte Ian Lauterbach reports on the situation in Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon on the brink of a large scale ground operation. Over the last 48 hours, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon has escalated significantly, with both sides exchanging significant fire. Concerns about a full-scale war in the Middle East and Gaza-like carnage in Lebanon are rising. The conflict began almost a year ago but has intensified in recent days, with Israel launching one of its largest air campaigns in history against Hezbollah targets.
The Israeli government has clearly stated its intent for “limited” ground operations in Southern Lebanon, and multiple western governments are currently in the process of evacuating their embassies from Lebanon. The question of Israeli intentions remains.
This article examines the situation in greater detail, analysing the potential outcomes and ramifications of the current conflict. The stakes are high, with the potential for a regional conflict that could involve other players and destabilise the entire Middle East.
Significant airstrikes hit Hezbollah’s underground headquarters in southern Beirut just 3 days ago. Reportedly, more than 100 tons of bunker-busting munitions were used in the attack on the deeply buried, heavily fortified bunker. The airstrike killed the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, and multiple Iranian commanders.
Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader since 1992, was almost cultishly revered by his followers. In public, the Secretary General of the „Party of God“ always appeared in traditional Shia attire and turban. In response, Iran announced five days of mourning for Nasrallah. Khamenei told Muslims to stand by the people of Lebanon and Hezbollah to confront Israel, stating that his death would not go ‘unavenged’.
The attack on the targeted headquarters, which was situated below a block of multi-story housing, is expected to have killed a large number of civilians. However, the number of civilians killed in the strike is yet unknown because of the large amount of weapons used.
That is the situation today. With war looming on the near horizon and with significant parts of Hezbollah’s capabilities – communication, coordination, target reconnaissance – destroyed, the question remains „what now?“.
An IDF spokesperson did not rule out the possibility of ground operations and reiterated, “We will do everything to ensure the safety of our citizens,” upon inquiry by BSN. Hezbollah began firing on northern Israel after years of ceasefire on the morning of October 8th. On that fateful morning, Hezbollah entered the war with Israel under the foolish assumption that the country would be unwilling to fight a two-front war – in Gaza and Northern Israel.
They presumed this protracted conflict with Israel would weaken Israel and lead to the end of the war in Gaza. Now, almost a year later, the War in Gaza is slowly ending – with no winners and only losers.
Israel usually does not engage in long, protracted wars of attrition because this is simply a significant strain on the economy, due to the low number of conscripts compared to reservists. However, Israel knows how to fight short, sharp wars:
- In Spring 2023, after massive rocket attacks on Southern Israel, Israel initiated Operation Shield and Arrow. Over a total of 4 days, Israel attacked Palestinian Jihad leadership, eliminating a total of 14 PIJ and PFLP commanders, including the replacement of the previously killed ones.
The same pattern is repeating in Lebanon now:
- After the Defense Ministry declared the shift of focus from the Gaza Strip to the North with the goal of enabling the return of the Israeli citizens to the North, most of the leadership of Hezbollah and their respective replacements were eliminated in 6 days.
Notably, the airstrikes that succeeded in killing Hassan Nasrallah were nicknamed ‘Operation New Order’. This was the same name unofficially given to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by former Prime Minister 1982. And a New Order indeed is coming – one yet unfathomable. The elimination of Hezbollah’s leadership has dealt a significant blow to the organization, leaving it in disarray and uncertain of its next steps.
The question remains: Is this only the start of a massive ground operation? Key figures in the Israeli government have hinted that “this is only the beginning. We will ensure the return of the residents to the north, by any means possible.”
To fully answer this question, we must first understand the context of the planned Israeli operation, for which the plans have remained mostly unchanged since the 2006 war.UN Resolution 1701 demands the disarmament of Hezbollah and the withdrawal of all militias behind the Litani, which divides Lebanon circa 30km behind the border with Israel.
Source: WIkipedia – en:User:Doron.
The only forces allowed to be positioned in front of this river are the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon and the Lebanese Army. This task was virtually impossible for the two actors to fulfill because of missing permissions and manpower, widespread corruption, missing funds, and outdated equipment, respectively.
Before October 7, Hezbollah members continuously violated this UN resolution. In summer of 2023, Berlin Story News reported from the Lebanese-Israeli border, highlighting outposts and fortified structures intended for use in attacks against Israel.
In a sad twist, we reported on Hezbollah’s plans for terror attacks on the northern border towns, including hostage taking and attacks on critical infrastructure, in the very same article. This was the exact playbook that would occur in Southern Israel not even 4 months later.
Pushing Hezbollah behind the Litani would mean putting the Israeli Northern towns out of the firing range of most of Hezbollah’s short-range missile arsenal – which makes up most of their firepower. However, this push back would be a significant undertaking, requiring a large-scale ground operation. The Israeli military is wary of engaging in another prolonged conflict in Lebanon, having learned from 2006 and 1982 war that such operations can be expensive and challenging to resolve.
Despite these challenges, the likely goal of Israel’s Army is the dismantlement of the rocket arsenal of Hezbollah and pushing back the militia behind the Litani. Avid readers of my reportings will already be aware of this, but a few words on the 2006 Lebanon War. This conflict began with a Hezbollah cross-border attack, which captured two Israeli soldiers and killed three others. Israel responded with an extensive bombing campaign and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. The war resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 Lebanese and 160 Israelis and caused significant damage to infrastructure in both countries. In Israeli military circles, it is widely regarded as a “missed opportunity” and strategic failure. The operation, intended to be swift, caused an unexpectedly high amount of Israeli casualties, many of these due to continuous rocket fire and the asymmetric warfare employed by Hezbollah.
The 1982 war was another significant conflict between Israel and Lebanon. Israel’s invasion aimed to push the PLO back from its northern border. This operation also became a prolonged and costly endeavor, with Israel eventually withdrawing from most Lebanese territory in 1985 after suffering significant casualties. A small strip of land, known as the „Security Zone,“ remained under Israeli control until 2000.
It is highly unlikely that a full occupation of Southern Lebanon will occur again, not unlike the invasion of 1982, which intended to dismantle the Palestinian Liberation Organization – whose attacks had repeatedly caused high casualties in Northern Israel is highly unlikely to occur again. Israel is simply lacking manpower to control such vast strips of land – with operations in Gaza requiring the withdrawal of troops from operations in the West Bank, and vice versa.
Instead, Israel will likely focus on surgical strikes and limited ground operations to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities, while avoiding a full-scale invasion and occupation. The goal is to push Hezbollah back from the border, destroy their rocket arsenal, and cripple command and control structures, without getting bogged down in a prolonged conflict.
The terrain of Southern Lebanon is not to be underestimated – with the September weather having muddied the terrain and making movement difficult. Hezbollah’s extensive tunnel network and fortified positions also pose significant challenges. Israel
Hezbollah’s primary objective is to maintain its position as the dominant political and military force in Lebanon. They seek to preserve their arsenal of rockets and missiles, viewing them as a deterrent against Israeli aggression. Hezbollah also aims to rally domestic and regional support, portraying itself as the defender of Lebanese sovereignty and the resistance against Israel. However, the group faces the challenge of balancing its militant activities with its political aspirations within the fragile Lebanese political landscape.
Israel will likely use this political instability to further weaken Hezbollah’s position. It may seek to exploit the group’s internal divisions and the broader political tensions in Lebanon to undermine its influence.
Hezbollah’s calculus is to avoid a full-scale confrontation with Israel that could jeopardize its political standing in Lebanon. Instead, the group aims to inflict enough damage on Israel to demonstrate its military capabilities, while stopping short of provoking a devastating Israeli response that could threaten its control over southern Lebanon. Hezbollah’s strategy revolves around maintaining a delicate balance between armed resistance and political influence within the Lebanese government and society.
In the current conflict, Iran’s primary goal is to maintain its influence and proxy power in Lebanon through Hezbollah. Iran seeks to preserve Hezbollah’s military capabilities as a deterrent against Israel, while also using it to project Iranian power in the region. However, Iran must balance its support for Hezbollah’s armed resistance with the need to avoid a direct confrontation with Israel that could lead to a devastating response. Iran’s strategy revolves around providing Hezbollah with the resources and backing to sustain its operations, without triggering a full-scale war that could risk its regional influence.
Focusing on potential outcomes, there are essentially four probable scenarios.
Hezbollah is significantly weakened, but they continue to maintain a presence in southern Lebanon despite an Israeli invasion. This leads to an uneasy ceasefire and strained relations between the two actors. Heavy rocket fire on Northern Israel will cause significant damage to communities on the border, and the fighting in Southern Lebanon will result in high civilian casualties on the Lebanese side, permanently displacing many.
Second scenario: Hezbollah is pushed back behind the Litani River, reducing the immediate threat to northern Israel. This could happen either by peace treaty, ceasefire or by Israeli action. From a civilian lens, the casualties will be similar or worse than in the first scenario. The displacement of Hezbollah from Southern Lebanon will weaken its influence over Lebanon, most likely leading to a renewed power struggle with other actors. Regardless if achieved by treaty or by Israeli armor, the new status quo will be unstable and challenging to enforce.
The conflict spirals into a broader regional war, drawing in increased activity from actors such Yemen, Iran, or even the United States. This could lead to a long-lasting and devastating conflict with extensive consequences. This scenario is less likely than the first two, especially considering that the killing of both high-ranking Hamas and Hezbollah members—one of them, Haniyeh, inside Iran—has not led to direct attacks from Iran. However, it is noted that in recent days, missile fire from Yemen has increased in volume. In this case, especially a renewed US involvement in the war in Lebanon—not unlike the Multinational Force in Lebanon in 1983, which was intended to serve as a peacekeeping force—will lead to high casualties and a protracted war.
Israel achieves its objectives of degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities, but the group remains a persistent threat. This leads to a cycle of conflict and instability in the region. This is essentially an expected outcome in any of the scenarios. A total defeat of Hezbollah is utopic, and years of counterinsurgency have shown the difficulty of completely dismantling terrorist organizations.
The likely outcome is a fragile ceasefire or uneasy truce, with Hezbollah remaining a threat to Israel’s security. Despite setbacks, the group will maintain a presence in southern Lebanon and continue to rebuild its capabilities. This cycle of conflict and instability will persist, as neither side can achieve a decisive victory. The region will face prolonged tensions and the risk of future flare-ups between Israel and Hezbollah.
That is the possible outcomes on the first evening of a week that will truly create a “New Order” for the Middle East.
